This paper examines the size, growth, salaries, per-pupil-costs, pupil achievement levels and cost-effectiveness of private schools, and compares these with the government school sector. Official data show a steep growth of private schooling and a corresponding rapid shrinkage in the size of the government school sector in India, suggesting parental abandonment of government schools. Data show that a very large majority of private schools in most states are 'low-fee' when judged in relation to: state per capita income, perpupil expenditure in the government schools, and the officially-stipulated rural minimum wage rate for daily-wage-labour. This suggests that affordability is an important factor behind the migration towards and growth of private schools. The main reason for the very low fee levels in private schools is their lower teacher salaries, which the data show to be a small fraction of the salaries paid in government schools; this is possible because private schools pay the market-clearing wage, which is depressed by a large supply of unemployed graduates in the country, whereas government schools pay bureaucratically determined minimum-wages. Private schools' substantially lower per-student-cost combined with their students' modestly higher learning achievement levels, means that they are significantly more cost-effective than government schools. The paper shows how education policies relating to private schools are harmful when formulated without seeking the evidence.
schooling in India. Before the passage of the Right to Education (RTE) Act 2009, in most states private schools were not even required to be registered let alone be mandatorily government-'recognised'. While officials thus do not have a comprehensive list of all unrecognised private schools, they do informally know of many of these schools, since they are required to serve closure notices to the unrecognised schools. Yet, the official District information System on Education (DISE), which is meant to be an annual census of all schools in the country, generally does not collect data from most of the so-called non-recognised private schools 1 . Moreover, coverage of even the recognised private schools is incomplete in DISE since not all private unaided schools give their data. Finally, to compound matters, although the DISE questionnaire separately identifies aided and unaided private schools, in the DISE data report cards published annually by the official agency 2 , in practice unfortunately these two types of schools are often lumped together and treated as a single category 'private schools'.
While the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) published by NGO Pratham is helpful in generating extensive evidence on private as well as public schools across about 15,000 villages across all Indian districts annually, it is based on a rural survey only and misses out urban India altogether. Moreover, it also lumps together private aided and private unaided schools into a single category 'private'. While for some states, the distinction is unimportant because there are few aided private schools there, in other states with a higher proportion of aided private schools, the distinction matters much.
Despite sharing the word 'private' in their names, private unaided and private aided schools differ fundamentally in their modes of operation. Private aided schools are virtually like public schools in the way they are governed. Although nominally and de jure run by their private management boards, de facto they are heavily governed by the state. Following centralising legislation in the early 1970s which virtually nationalised the aided schools 3 , their teachers' salaries are paid by the government treasury and not via the private school management; they are paid at the same rate as government school teachers; and their salaries are paid directly into the bank accounts of their teachers, exactly as in government schools. Moreover, private aided schools' teachers are recruited and appointed not by their respective managements but by a government-appointed state Education Service Commission, the same body that recruits and appoints teachers to the government schools. All this implies that after the early 1970s, aided schools became virtually like government schools, where teachers are roughly only as accountable to their respective private managements as government school teachers are to district education authorities. Furthermore, aided private cannot charge any tuition fee in elementary education (upto grade 8), just as government schools cannot.
By contrast, private unaided schools conform to the stereotypical idea of what private schools are, namely autonomous fee charging schools run by private managements and which recruit/appoint their own teachers and pay them salary scales determined by themselves 4 (roughly based on the supply and demand of educated persons in their local labour market), rather than necessarily following the government pay structure. Thus, we shall refer to private aided schools simply as Aided schools, and shall refer to private unaided schools simply as Private schools. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, all Indian schools are categorised into three major types: Government schools (whether run by state, central or local government), Aided schools and Private schools.
The National Sample Survey (NSS) which is an annual household survey, periodically collects information on education, for example, in 1995-96, 2007-08 and again in 2014-15 . While NSS is a household survey and not a school survey, it nevertheless has valuable information on enrolment in different school types, which permits cross-checking the veracity and comprehensiveness of school censuses (such as DISE) and surveys (such as ASER), and it also furnishes data on household expenditure on education in different types of schoolgovernment, aided, and private 4 .
This paper draws together evidence from all the above sources, i.e., raw National Sample Survey (NSS) data for various years (latest being 2014-15, 71 st Round NSS), the ASER data, District Information System on Education (DISE) data, and data in studies carried out by individual scholars or institutions.
The size and growth of the private schooling sector in India
A useful starting point is to first establish the extent of private schooling in the country, and to see its growth over time. We present some data on this. But before doing that, it is useful to consider the definition of 'private schools' in official DISE data.
Published DISE tables typically divide all schools into two types: 'government' and 'private' schools. They inadvertently misestimate the extent of private schooling, for three reasons:
1. DISE fails to cover all of the so-called 'unrecognised' private unaided schools, leading to an under-estimation in the true size of the private school sector. 2. In its published tables, DISE does not add even the few unrecognised private schools that it does collect data on, again leading to an underestimation of the private sector. 3. DISE lumps together aided and private unaided schools into a single category 'private', leading to an over-estimation of the true size of the private school sector. Of these three sources of bias, the third leads to a relatively minor over-estimation, but the first two sources lead to a substantial under-estimation, of the size of the private schooling sector in India, and we turn to show this below.
Failure to comprehensively cover the unrecognised private schools
As stated in the Introduction, DISE does not cover all the un-recognised private schools. Kingdon (2007) reported the findings of five studies from different parts of India to show that there were roughly as many unrecognised private schools in India as there were recognised ones 5 and there continue to be journalistic reports of large numbers of unrecognised schools. In other words, DISE reportage of private schools appears to be greatly under-estimated.
While the RTE Act 2009 mandated that no school can run without obtaining a certificate of government recognition, thousands such schools nevertheless continue to function. District education authorities routinely give warning notices to unrecognised schools each year, threatening to close them down, which suggests they are well aware of many unrecognised schools, and yet DISE data report zero unrecognised schools in many states, as seen in Table  3 , e.g. Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, thus missing out at least tens of thousands of unrecognised private schools 6 . In summary, DISE seriously under-estimates the extent of private schooling in the country because of its failure to comprehensively cover the unrecognised private schools.
Failure to include even the unrecognised private schools on which data is collected
While DISE collects information on a few unrecognised private schools in many states, and Table 3 (calculated by the author from raw DISE data), shows that such included schools constituted 2% of all elementary schools in the country in 2014-15, many DISE tables published by NUEPA exclude these schools from the 'private schools' category. This leads to another small under-estimation of the true extent of private schooling in the country.
Lumping together aided and private schools
As mentioned above in the Introduction, aided schools are private virtually only in name, since their pupil fee levels and teacher salaries and emoluments are the same as in government schools, and since their teachers are paid directly by the government, and are recruited and appointed by the same body and via the same process as government school teachers. The only role of the private management is that they originally provided the land/buildings in which the school runs and, in consideration of that, the monthly salary sheet of the aided school teachers is counter-signed by their private management before salaries are transferred by the government treasury into the teachers' bank accounts. This minor role plus the fact that aided school teachers cannot be transferred to other schools (whereas government school teachers can), is used to maintain the veneer that these schools belong to their private managements, and in most of the tables presented in the DISE data reports, the term 'Private' school includes both aided and private schools. The separate classification of these two school types -aided and private -and separate presentation of data on them, is an important issue that needs serious thought by policy makers.
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In summary, published DISE data over-estimates the extent of private schooling in the country by including aided schools in the category of 'private schools', but seriously underestimates the extent of private schooling by excluding the unrecognised private schools. The impact of the RTE Act 2009 on the number of unrecognised private schools is unclear as yet, and is a subject for new research.
For the purposes of this paper, and in contrast with DISE data, we use the term 'private school' to include private unaided schools (both recognised and unrecognised) as these display the conventional defining features of 'private', i.e. schools that have autonomy in teacher recruitment and job-separation and in fixing teacher salary and pupil fee levels, and our definition of 'private' excludes aided schools. Where we present data on government (public) schools, aided schools are again not taken into account, even though they are publicly funded and controlled.
Extent of private schooling (in 2014-15)
What proportion of the elementary age children are actually studying in private schools in the different states of India? Table 1 shows the pattern of private school attendance in India. Firstly, private schooling is much more spread in urban than in rural areas. Secondly, the utilisation of private schooling is perverse from an equity point of view because (except in rural areas in the secondary age) private schooling is most prevalent at the primary school stage, less prevalent at the upper primary stage, and the least prevalent than at the secondary/highersecondary school stage. Table 1 shows that in 2014-15, in the primary school age group (6-10 year olds), 49% of urban and 21% of rural children attended private schools. That nearly half of all primary age children in urban India are studying in private schools is striking. In the upper primary school age group (11-14 year olds), a rather smaller proportion are attending private unaided schools: 40.7% in urban and 17.5% in rural India. This is perverse from an equity point of view because it implies that many children who were willing and able to pay for their primary education (by attending private schools) end up going to free government or aided schools for their upper primary education. In urban areas, at the secondary school stage, the proportion attending private schools shrinks further still, to 36% -compared with 49% at the primary and 41% at the upper primary stage.
Apart from this wide rural-urban disparity, there are also pronounced inter-state variations in the extent of utilisation of private schooling, as seen in Table 2 . States with high prevalence of private schooling are Andhra, Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan, Telengana and Uttar Pradesh.
Change in private schooling, over time
How has the extent of private schooling changed over time? Table 4 shows the temporal change in number of government and private schools, and Table 5 shows the change in their enrolments, based on the author's analysis of raw DISE data on 20 major states of India. Table  4 shows that, over the four year period 2010-11 to 2014-15, the total stock of government schools in India (20 major states of India) rose by a mere 16,376 govt. schools. By contrast the number of private schools rose by 71,360 schools. Despite the modest increase in the number of govt. schools, the total enrolment in govt. schools over this period actually fell by 11.1 million (1 crore 11 lakh) students, whereas total enrolment in private schools rose by 16 million (1 crore 60 lakh) students, over the same 4 year period.
In some states, the growth of private schooling was very pronounced, e.g. in Tables 4 and  5 in Uttar Pradesh, the number of private schools rose by 31,196 over this short four-year period, and private school enrolment rose by nearly 7 million (70 lakh) students and govt. school enrolment fell by 2.6 million (26 lakh) students, over this four-year period.
Another way of gauging the demand for private and government schools is to observe how the average size of schools has changed over time. Table 5 shows that the average size of govt. elementary schools in India fell from 122 students per school in 2010-11 to 109 students per school by 2014-15, a decline of 12 students per govt. school, or a decline of about 10% over a short four year period. In some states, the average size of govt. schools fell steeply, e.g. in Maharashtra, UP, etc. By contrast, the average size of private schools was significantly larger in the baseline year (202 instead of 122), and it also further rose from 202 to 207 in the four year period between 2011 and 2015, even though the number (supply) of private schools also rose strongly over the period by around 70,000 new private schools. Table 5 also shows the picture for each state. In Madhya Pradesh, mean govt. school size fell from an already low of 95 students in 2010 to only 70 students in 2015, reduction of 26.3% in mean govt. school size in just 4 years. While it is expected that average school size in the hilly states would be lower, the very low average enrolment per govt. school of 49 in Himachal, 54 in Uttarakhand and 55 in Jammu-Kashmir in 2010 fell further to 38, 44 and 43 respectively, by 2015. An average size of 38 students per govt. school means less than 8 students per class (for primary schools with classes 1 to 5) or less than 5 students per class (for elementary schools, with classes 1 to 8). Thus, the govt. schools in these three hilly states are both pedagogically and economically unviable. Other states which saw a heavy reduction in govt. school enrolments and thus in the mean govt. school size are Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Maharashtra and Haryana. In several large states, by 2015-16, the mean number of pupils in govt. schools fell to significantly below 100, e.g. Madhya Pradesh (70), Andhra (73), Chattisgarh (74), Assam (83), Odisha (86) Maharashtra (88), Karnataka (89), Rajasthan (89), again pointing to both pedagogical and economic unviability.
The abandonment of govt. schools and the shift towards private schools is also clearly visible when we examine how the number of govt. schools that are 'small' or 'tiny' has increased over time.
Abandonment of government schools, migration to private schools
We define a 'small' school as one in which total enrolment (in the school as a whole) is 50 or fewer students, which means 10 or fewer students per class, in a primary school, or it means 6 or fewer students per class, in an elementary school. We define a 'tiny' school as one in which total enrolment is 20 or fewer students, which means 4 or fewer students per class, in a primary school or say 3 students per class in an elementary school 7 . Table 6 illustrates the phenomenon of the abandonment and emptying of govt. schools by highlighting its manifestation in the rapid growth of 'small' and 'tiny' government schools in India.
We can measure the emptying of government schools further by examining the small-school phenomenon, and asking whether the number of govt. schools that are small or tiny is growing over time. Source: DISE raw data, from www.dise.in Note: Note: *Andhra Pradesh here includes Telengana for 2015-16, in order to permit comparison with 2010-11. Thus the reduction in govt. school enrolment in Andhra Pradesh by 2015-16 here is not due to the removal of Telengana. The increase in private school enrolments does not exactly mirror the decrease in govt. school enrolment because children may also shift to aided schools and because the child population of elementary school age increased in many states. Over the 5 year period 2010-2015, the average size of govt. schools fell by 12 %; the average size of private schools rose by 3%, despite the large increase in the number of private schools. 30 .2% of all govt. schools were 'small' (had total enrolment of 50 or fewer), in 2014-15, 36.7% were 'small' and in 2015-16, 40 .0 % were 'small'. The quality of the 2010-11 DISE data on the number of teachers is suspect for certain states -e.g. in Madhya Pradesh, there are too few teachers but in Jammu & Kashmir, there appear to be too many, in the small government schools. DISE data quality has improved over time, as inconsistencies have been progressively sorted out. Data on govt. school teachers' salary for 2014-15 is available from Ramchandran's Study (NUEPA, 2015) , where mean govt. primary school teacher salary (averaged across all new and experienced teachers) was 40,600 per month, but for the sake of simplicity, we took it as Rs. 40,000 per month. For 2015-16/2010-11, it has been inflated/deflated by 9%, assuming a salary inflation rate of 9% per annum. Thus, mean teacher salary is taken as Rs. 28,337 in 2010-11 and Rs. 43,600 in 2015-16 . For illustration, salary inflation in Uttar Pradesh is shown in Annex Table 2 where it is seen that total take-home salary has increased by more than 15% each year between 2008 and 2017, or if we take only the 2010-2016 period, by 8.5% per annum. 
Fee levels of private schools
What are the fee levels of private unaided schools, and can we benchmark them as 'high' or 'low'? While there is no official data collected from private schools on fee levels, fortunately the questionnaire of the 71 st Round National Sample Survey (NSS) of 2014-15 included -in its Section 6 -detailed questions on education expenditure on each individual person aged 5-29 years old in the sample households. The variable we take as the measure of school fee is named in the survey as: "Course fee (including tuition fee, examination fee, development fee and other compulsory payments)". The survey also asks separately for expenditure on "books, stationery and uniform", on "transport", and on "private coaching", which we have not taken into account, as we were interested in isolating only the course fee including all compulsory payments that parents pay to the school as fee.
To find out the fee levels of private schools, we took the sub-set of children who report studying in private unaided schools and are aged between 6 and 14 years old, the elementary school age group. These children are of the age to which the Right to Education (RTE) Act 2009 applies, and are meant to be in classes 1 to 8. The mean and median 'total course fee' in private unaided schools, computed from the NSS data, are presented in Table 8 , but before turning to that, it is worth noting how this total course fee is distributed.
Graph 1 shows that total fee is very log-normally distributed, with a pronounced rightward skew, rather than normally distributed with the standard Gaussian bell-shape. When a quantity is log-normally distributed, the median is a better measure of central tendency than the mean since it down-weights the undue importance of the few very high values, i.e., it does not permit undue influence of the extremely high fee levels of the few children who study in the very highfee elite schools. Hence in Table 8 , although we present both private unaided schools' mean and median fee levels, it is preferable to focus on the median fee levels. Table 8 shows that median private unaided school fee level in urban India was Rs. 500 pm and in rural India Rs. 275 pm. Taking all India (rural and urban), the median fee was Rs. 417 per month (or Rs. 5000 per annum).
However, there is a great deal of inter-state variation in private school fee levels. For example, from Rs. 117 pm in rural Uttar Pradesh to Rs. 692 pm (six times higher) in rural Punjab; or from Rs. 250 pm in urban UP to Rs. 1800 pm (seven times higher), in urban Delhi.
Graph 2 shows a scatter plot with states' median rural private school fee level on the x-axis and on the y-axis a measure of the quality of rural govt. schools in the state (measured by the percentage of students of govt. schools with various given literacy and numeracy skills, from ASER data). This plot shows a positive -if somewhat concave -relationship between raw private school fee levels and govt. school quality level, suggesting that the better functioning are the government schools in a state, the less the need felt by poor parents for private education, and thus the more elite (the more high fee charging) the private schools in that state. Similarly, the worse the government school quality in a state, the greater the perceived need by even the poorer families to demand private schooling of any description, leading to the higher supply of a lot of even 'low-fee' budget private schools. 
Graph 1a
Distribution of (annual) fee level without constraining the fee values. Notice that a very tiny number of students report paying fee from Rupees 50,000 to Rupees 2 lakh per annum (above about Rs. 4000 pm).
Graph 1b
Distribution of (annual) fee level after constraining the fee values to be below Rs. 30,000 pa (Rs. 2500 pm). Even here, it is visible that only a very small number of students pay fees above around Rs. 12,000 pa or Rs. 1000 pm.
Graph 1c
This shows the distribution of log of course fee, rather than of the course fee. It is apparent that this is much more normally distributed (much closer to the bell-shaped 'Gaussian' distribution) than graphs 1a and 1b. 
Benchmarking private school fee levels
Is the private unaided schools' fee observed in Table 8 low or high? Before turning to that, we examine what percentage of private-school students pay fee below given absolute threshold levels. This is presented in Table 9 . It shows that in states such as Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa, about 70 to 85 per cent of children studying in private unaided schools are paying fee of less than Rs. 500 per month (Rs 6000 per annum). Only a minority (15% -30%) of private school attendees pay fees above Rs. 500 pm.
Benchmarking with respect to state per capita income
One way of benchmarking the size of the private school fee is to see its ratio with respect to the state per capita income. Here, since government reports mean (rather than median) per capita income, we use the mean private school fee level rather than the median. Table 10 shows that nationally, private schools' mean fee is around 9.2% of the state per capita income.
22
Benchmarking with respect to the minimum wage of daily wage labourers A second way of benchmarking private school fee is to see to what extent the poorest paid workers can afford private school fee. The last three columns of Table 10 attempt to do that. Srivastava (2013) suggests that a useful way of defining 'low fee' schools is schools where the monthly fee is equal to one day's wage of the daily wage labourers, one of the lowest paid worker groups, who get the minimum daily wage as announced annually by the Ministry of Rural Development. Column (g) of Table 10 shows the officially mandated minimum daily wage of April 2014 for each state. We take it that daily wagers work 300 days a year and thus predict the annual wage for daily-wagers. Expressing the median annual private school fee as a percentage of this annual minimum wage in column (h) shows that, on average, private schools' median annual fee is around 10.2% of the annual minimum wage of daily wagers. Uttar Pradesh is an outlier, in that private school annual fee is only 3.8% of the annual earning of daily-wagers in the state, suggesting that even very poor people can access private schooling in Uttar Pradesh, and this is consistent with the high utilisation of private schooling in UP.
Another variant for benchmarking private schools' fee is to ask: for what percentage of rural private school pupils is their actual monthly fee below the daily minimum wage of their state. Column (i) shows that, on average, 26% of rural private school pupils' monthly fee is below their state's daily minimum wage. While UP is again an outlier (with 67% rural private school pupils' monthly fee being below the minimum daily wage of UP in 2014), in states such as West Bengal, Orissa, Jharkhand and Chattisgarh, the proportion is higher than one-third; it suggests that one third or more of the private schools in these states are 'low fee' schools by this definition, i.e. that educate the poorest children.
Benchmarking with respect to the per pupil expenditure in govt. schools
A third way of benchmarking whether private school fee level in a state is 'high' or 'low', is to compare it with the state's per pupil expenditure (PPE) in the government school system. Table  11 shows the private unaided schools' median fee levels and also the per-pupil expenditure (PPE) in the govt. funded school system, statewise and for India as a whole 8 . It shows that in India as a whole, just under 80 per cent of the private-school-going children study in those private schools where the fee is below the government schools' per pupil expenditure. In a large number of states, more than 90% of private school students paid fees lower than the estimated PPE in the govt. funded schools. The last column in Table 11 shows that -averaging across the states -private school fee is only 47% of the PPE in govt-funded schools estimated by Dongre and Kapur (2016) , and that is when their calculation of govt. PPE is a serious underestimate of the true PPE in the govt. school system (for reasons set out in Annex 1). The level of private school fee also has implications for the reimbursement from government to private schools for educating poor and disadvantaged children under the Right to Education Act 2009. Annex 2 spells out the implications.
Policy implications of this benchmarking exercise
In summary, the above evidence on private unaided schools' fee levels is surprising, and is at odds with popular perceptions, as it shows that a good proportion of private schooling caters to the really poor. The evidence suggests that most private schools in India can be considered "low fee" in the precise sense that their fee is below the government's per pupil expenditure in its own schools. This evidence discredits the oft-repeated belief that much of private schooling in India is elite and exclusive. This realisation is significant because perceptions about the nature of private schools have important implications for the making of policy towards private schools. To take one example, the realisation that in the majority of private schools, fee levels are far lower than government schools' per pupil expenditure draws the education policy maker's attention to the fact that when a high proportion of the well-funded government schools themselves cannot comply with the infrastructure norms of the Right to Education (RTE) Act 2009 9 , how can private schools do so (without public subsidy), since the majority of them run on a small fraction of the unit cost of government schools. The kind of data presented here to benchmark private school fee levels can help decision-takers to make more evidence-informed education policy that is more realistic and less wishful, and to avoid counter-productive effects such as the closure of the low-fee private schools which may be successfully imparting learning but which lack the resources to fulfil the demanding infrastructure norms 10 .
Teacher salaries in private schools
The major factor behind the lower unit-cost of producing education in private than public schools is the much lower teacher salaries of private schools compared with government and aided schools. Unfortunately, there is no systematic documentation or evidence collected by any agency nationally on individual teacher salaries, either for government or private schools. One has to rely on the few sporadic small-scale surveys and studies from individual states. However, fortunately, the National University of Educational Planning and Administration (NUEPA) carried out a two year study of government school teachers across nine Indian states in 2014-15, in collaboration with the State Councils of Educational Research and Training (SCERTs) of these nine states, in which they also collected information on teacher salaries in government schools (Ramachandran, 2015) . We use this study for evidence on government school teachers' salaries. For evidence on private school teachers' salaries, we turn to individual small-scale studies from two districts of Punjab (CCS, 2014) Firstly, we show in Table 12 evidence on teacher salaries in govt. schools across 6 Indian states reported in Ramachandran (2015) . She reports the take-home salary levels of three types of teachers in govt. schools: newly appointed teachers, teachers with 15 years' work experience and teachers with 25 years' experience, each at the primary level and at the secondary level. For simplification, we take the salary of a teacher with 15 years' experience as representing the average salary of teachers in govt. schools. The teachers of junior/upper-primary -classes 6, 7 and 8 -are paid salaries equal to secondary school teachers in India, thus the salary shown for secondary teachers are also the salary-levels of the upper-primary teachers. Taking the simple average of salaries across the states, the last row of Table 12 shows that in the school year 9 Section 18 of the RTE Act 2009 stipulates that no private unaided school can be established or continue to function without obtaining a certificate of 'recognition' from the government, and section 19 lays down the various penalties (including closure) for non-compliance with the given norms and conditions. While section 8(g) of the Act specifies as the state's duty to ensure that govt. schools also conform to the norms of the Act, there are no penalties if they do not and thus, de facto, there is no momentum for govt. funded schools to comply. 10 NISA (2014) We present two ways of benchmarking whether this govt. school salary level is high or low: one is to compare govt. teacher salaries with teacher salaries in the private school sector and the other is to compare govt. salaries with the 'state per capita income' (PCI) of the respective states, and then see whether that ratio (of mean teacher salary to PCI) is higher than in other countries with which India compares itself. Table 13 shows that govt. primary school teacher salary is, on average, about 7 times (and govt. upper-primary teacher salary is about 9 times) the per capita income of the respective states. To simplify, one could say that in India govt. elementary school teachers' salary is -on average -around 8 times the country's per capita income. Table 15 presents the meagre evidence on private school teachers' salaries available from various parts of India in different years. In Kansal's study of Delhi schools in the late 1980s, the average salary of private school teachers was 47% of the average salary of govt. school teachers, i.e. just under half. In the early 1990s, it was also similar, between around 40 -49% in Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. By the early 2000s however, in Uttar Pradesh and in (20 states of) India, the ratio of private to government teachers' salary had fallen to 20%, i.e. private school teachers were paid, on average, only one-fifth of the pay levels of government school teachers. This was largely the result of the implementation of the Fifth Pay Commission recommendations, which greatly raised the bureaucratically-set teacher salaries in govt-funded schools, but did not impact private school teachers' salaries. In Table  15 , Kingdon and Banerji found that by 2008, private school teacher salaries constituted only 8% of govt. school regular teachers' salaries, in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.
Benchmarking salary against state per capita income
After implementation of the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission in 2009, government school teachers' salaries roughly doubled in one go (see Kingdon, 2010) and, again, private school teachers' market-determined salaries saw only incremental change. Thus, by 2014, Antony & Chaudhury (2014) report that in rural Punjab, mean private school teacher salary was Rs. 1925 per month and we know from Ramachandran (2015) -as reported in Table  13 above -that average govt. primary school teacher salary in rural Punjab in 2014 was Rs. 59,654 per month, i.e. private school teachers pay was only about 3.2% of govt. school teachers' pay ! How can private schools can pay salaries that are this much lower than government school salaries? The reason is that whereas government teachers' pay is a bureaucratically-set high 'minimum wage', which may also be influenced by political pulls and pressures and be responsive to lobbying by strong government school teacher unions, private schools generally pay their teachers the market-determined wage i.e. the wage level determined by the demand and supply of educated persons in the labour market which is characterised by an excess supply of graduates; the 10.5 per cent graduate unemployment rate in India means that many unemployed graduates are willing to take teaching jobs at low salaries in private schools, and private schools take advantage of this low market-clearing wage.
To summarise, the fact that govt. school teachers are 4 to 8 times higher paid in India than in China and other countries suggests that in India, teachers must be drawn from a much higher part of the ability distribution in the population than in China and the other countries shown in Table 14 . But this leads to the puzzle as to why, if teachers are substantially more able in India than in other countries, did Indian students do much worse than, for example, Chinese children in the international PISA standardized test of reading, mathematics, science, where China came 2 nd and India came 73rd, out of 74 countries. Similarly, if public school teachers are paid twelve to thirty times higher than private school teachers (since 2008) as shown in Table 15 , one would expect that the quality of teaching and thus children's learning outcomes would be better in public than in private schools, but it is not so. The next section of the paper compares the relative learning achievement levels of children in private and public schools. Source: Ramachandran (2015) at the National University of Educational Planning and Administration (NUEPA). Note: R -Rural; U -Urban. Actual take home salary includes basic pay, grade pay, dearness allowance, House Rent Allowance (HRA), City Compensatory Allowance (CCA), and other benefits and deductions (if any). Kansal (1990) ; Govinda & Varghese (1993) ; Kingdon (1994) 
Learning outcomes in private schools
While the National Council of Educational Research and Training, New Delhi (NCERT) has been carrying out large-scale surveys of children's learning achievement levels using Item Response Theory since 2011, it conducts these only in public schools. Fortunately, it is possible to compare achievement levels in govt. and private schools in the surveys carried out for the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER, various years). Table 16 based on ASER data shows that while children's learning levels in both private and public schools are low, they are higher in private than public schools.
The ASER report presents only raw learning achievement data but, since private school students typically come from better-off and more educated homes, their achievement levels would be expected to be higher even if private schools were of no better quality than public schools. Thus comparing raw learning levels in private and public schools could lead to a potentially false inference that private schools are higher quality.
Luckily, there is quite sophisticated evidence in India which compares learning levels in the two types of schools after statistically controlling for the socio-economic background of the children studying in private and public schools. The different authors have used a variety of data sources, e.g. the National Human Development Survey, the ASER survey, Young Lives survey and surveys in particular states or districts that the authors themselves conducted. The published literature published uses either simple regression analysis (Tooley and Dixon, 2005; Wadhwa, 2014) , or use a variety of elaborate econometric techniques to correct for the problems of 'selectivity' and 'endogeneity', namely the problem that more able or more motivated students may self-select into private schools, techniques such as household fixed effects, village fixed effects, propensity score matching methods, panel data approach and randomised control trials. These studies are by Kingdon (1996) , Desai et al (2008) , Goyal (2009), French and Kingdon (2010) , Chudgar and Quin (2012) , Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2013) , Singh (2015) and Azam et. al. (2016) . This evidence shows that when students' home background is controlled for, the large raw learning-gap between private and public schools falls but, in most studies, it does not disappear: typically an achievement advantage of 0.10 to 0.35 standard deviations remains. This literature indicates that children's learning levels in private schools are no worse than, and in many studies better than, those in government schools, after controlling rigorously for the differing home backgrounds of the children in these two types of school.
The next section puts this evidence (on the relative effectiveness of public and private schools) together with evidence on the unit costs of private and public schools, to examine the 'value for money' (VFM) offered to fee-paying parents by private schools and the VFM that accrues from public expenditure on education.
Value for Money from private schools
A study by puts the ASER evidence on learning levels of students in public and private schools together with the evidence on per pupil expenditure (PPE) in public and private schools in eight major states of India, to examine the 'value for money' offered by public and private schools. Table 17 shows the value for money (VFM) calculation 11 . While there is much inter-state variation, we illustrate the findings by looking at the example of Madhya Pradesh. Table 17 shows that annual PPE in public schools in Madhya Pradesh was Rupees 9384 and PPE in private schools was Rupees 3700 per annum, and thus the public : private PPE ratio was 2.5:1 (see row 'g') i.e. public schools operated at 2.5 times the per-pupilexpenditure of private schools. It also shows that the ratio of public to private students' reading achievement levels was 0.48:1, i.e. public schools produced only 48% as much learning as private schools. Putting these two things together we find that private schools offer 5.3 times the value for money (VFM) as public schools in Madhya Pradesh. The findings are very similar for Kerala. However, there is much variation across the states. While in Bihar, Tamil Nadu, Punjab and Orissa, private schools are roughly twice as cost-effective (offer twice as much VFM) as public schools, in Gujarat, private schools offer 12 times as much VFM as public schools, and Uttar Pradesh is an outlier, with private schools there offering 29 times as much VFM as public schools -which is largely due to the very low fee levels of private schools in Uttar Pradesh, as also seen earlier in Tables 8 to 11 . also present VFM calculations using numeracy achievement levels in private and public schools and the results there are even starker, though they are not presented here for space reasons.
Change over time in the 'cost per unit of learning' in govt. schools can also be seen in the last column of Annex Table 2 . This shows that the cost per learning unit has roughly trebled in govt. schools in just the 6 year period between 2010 and 2016. This is a product of both falling learning achievement levels and strongly rising teacher salaries in govt. schools, which the table shows increased by over 15 percent per annum in the period 2008 to 2017 (the period from just before the Sixth Pay Commission to just after the Seventh Pay Commission), or increased by 8.5% per annum, if we take just the period from 2010 to 2016.
The Right to Education Act and its provision of Public Private Partnership
The high value for money offered by private schools is probably what led to the adoption of a kind of public private partnership (PPP) in India's Right to Education (RTE) Act 2009, with government funding and private schools producing education.
While India at the time of Independence already had an extensive PPP in education, namely the aided school system of privately managed schools funded by government, in fact, the aided schools, over time, due to centralising legislation in the early 1970s (discussed in Section 2 and footnote 3) have become virtually like govt. schools. Now, like govt. schools:
(i) they have little autonomy, since a government-appointed Service Commission recruits their teachers, and they have to charge govt. prescribed (nil) fee; (ii) they face no competition for survival since they have guaranteed state funding, de facto irrespective of any decline in their number of students; (iii) they are not very accountable to parents since their funding is secure irrespective of whether parents like/patronise them or not. (iv) their teachers are not very accountable to their private management boards since their salaries are paid directly into their bank accounts from the government treasury.
However, whether PPP will solve the problems of education is thought to depend on the extent to which the system exemplifies autonomy, freedom from bureaucratic control, inter-school competition, and accountability towards parents.
Perhaps that is why the Right to Education (RTE) Act 2009 brought in a new form of PPP whereby private schools (all of which are obliged to give at least 25% of their seats to disadvantaged children) get a per-student reimbursement from government. This form of PPP represents a per student grant and it effectively sets up inherently stronger incentives for schools to keep parents satisfied and give good quality education, since they would lose public funding if a child left to join another school.
However Secondly, many private schools fear corruption in official release of reimbursements and fear that, by accepting public money, they will come under the purview of the Right to Information Act and can be harassed, blackmailed and subjected to extortion by unscrupulous persons on the grounds that they do not fulfil some rule or another, from among a large number of rules, many of which are perceived to be impractical or which are mutually incompatible with other rules 13 .
Some groups 14 have suggested that a way to overcome this conundrum is for government to fund private schools in this type of PPP by giving the per-child subsidy to parents as a voucher or 'Direct Benefit Transfer' which the parents can then use at a private school of their choice. Moreover, instead of paying for only a small proportion of disadvantaged children to attend (25% of seats in) private schools, all disadvantaged children could potentially be given school choice funded by vouchers. However, this idea has not been seriously considered.
12 When a school run by the Urn Education Society in Mumbai went to court against a threat by the state government to shut it down due to its refusal to admit more children for free under the RTE Act because the Maharashtra state govt. had not paid the school a reimbursement of Rs. 50 lakh (approx. Rs. 5 million) for three years, in a judgment given out on 5 th December 2016, the Bombay High Court was unsympathetic, ordering the school to admit more children forthwith, irrespective of the large backlog of non-payment of reimbursement by the govt. See http://indianexpress.com/article/education/admit-rte-kids-school-not-a-money-making-venturebombay-hc-4412651/ (accessed on 6 Dec. 2016) 13 To take one example, RTE Rules say that to gain government recognition, a school must be compliant with the National Building Code, i.e. be made with iron-reinforced concrete. In focus group discussions with this author, many small private schools from rural parts of Uttar Pradesh claimed that this rule is used of extort bribes from them, while most govt. schools do not comply with this norm. To take another example from Uttar Pradesh, the recognition rule notified in a Govt. Order dated 8 May 2013 that a private school cannot raise its tuition fee by more than 10% once every three years, is mutually incompatible with another pre-existing UP govt. rule from 1991 that in order to get a 'No Objection Certificate' of the Govt. of UP, the school has to pay the govt.-prescribed salaries to teachers, which typically rise by about 10% per annum. No school can comply with both these rules at the same time. There are many examples of thoughtless rules and there is anecdotal evidence that some unscrupulous persons, by threatening to use the Right to Information Act 2005, exploit these lacunae in the rules to demand bribes from private schools. 14 E.g. the Think Tank Centre for Civil Society and the National Independent Schools Alliance (NISA).
One frequent criticism of the PPP provision of the RTE Act 2009 is that it allows only a fraction of the poor and disadvantaged children to attend private schools. As per National Sample Survey (NSS, 2014-15) data, 30% of children aged 6-14 in India study in private unaided schools, so 25% or a quarter of their total capacity comes to 7.5 percent. That is, the RTE Act guarantees for 7.5% of children to study in private schools under 'free and compulsory education', not even for all poor/disadvantaged children, let alone for all children. The children designated in the RTE Rules as 'disadvantaged' (Schedule Caste, Schedule Tribe and Other Backward Caste children) alone constitute nearly 70% of the children in the country. Together with 'economically weaker section' children, the proportion of poor and disadvantaged children comes to easily more than 80% children of the country, but RTE provision for attendance in private schools is only for 7.5% of the children, i.e. this benefit of the RTE Act is available to less than 10% of the eligible children. Given the large demand for few private school seats, applicant children are selected for private schools on the basis of a lottery, which is also seen to raise some ethical issues.
There is another source of resistance to the RTE Act from private schools. The low-fee private schools and their associations (for example, NISA 15 ) have objected to sections 18 and 19 of the RTE Act that impinge on them adversely. Section 18 stipulates that private schools cannot be established or continue to function without obtaining a 'certificate of recognition' from the state government, though it does not decree the same for government schools. Section 19 taken together with the Schedule of the RTE Act, lays down the conditions a private school has to fulfil (maximum pupil-teacher-ratio norms and infrastructure norms) in order to gain government recognition, and it also specifies the penalties for violation of the recognition conditions. Many state governments have added other conditions 16 .
While section 8(g) of the Act states that government schools shall also conform to the norms of the Schedule, they are not obliged to obtain a certificate of recognition and are not subject to penalties for non-compliance with the recognition conditions. Official DISE data show that a good proportion of government schools do not fulfil many of the recognition conditions 17 , but no notices are given to these schools to shut down, but private schools that cannot fulfil the same norms are given closure notices. Data collated from the public domain by NISA on school closures due to the RTE Act, show that as of October 2016, 9382 private schools had received closure threat, another 7898 private schools had received actual closure notices, and a further 3332 private schools had actually closed down, (http://nisaindia.org/data-on-school-closures), based on data available from only a few states, e.g., data on actual school closures from government documents is available only from three states 18 .
An important recognition norm specified in the state rules of the RTE Act 2009 is that the school must be a registered society, not run for private gain or profit. This stricture inconveniences the vast majority of private schools, which are low-fee and which run for the livelihoods of their founding entrepreneurs, and is also objectionable to many high-fee private school founders who seek a return on their investment. While it is likely that a small proportion of the roughly 300,000 recognised private schools in the country are run by benefactors and philanthropists who give land, buildings, furniture, etc. as charity, without expectation of profit, it is unlikely to be true of the large bulk of private schools. This impractical recognition condition renders probably most private schools illegal, while creating the myth that private schooling in India is mostly charitable in nature.
In resisting sections 18 and 19 of the RTE Act 2009, the private school associations also allege that apart from being expensive and impractical, many of the recognition norms of the RTE Act prescribed for schools are not evidence based, for example, they cite research showing that a pupil teacher ratio below 30 does not consistently lead to higher student learning. Similarly, while they say it is desirable that schools have furniture for children and have a separate office room for clerical staff, boundary wall, etc., these are not necessary in order to produce good learning outcomes, and should not become the reason for closing down the lowest-fee rural private schools. In short, they state that an Act which avows to guarantee children's right to education should not paradoxically become a means to violate that right due to school closures, in the name of some infrastructure and input norms which have no proven connection with schooling quality; instead, they argue for school recognition based on the learning levels of the school's pupils. At the time of writing this article, National Education Policy is under formulation and India's HRD ministry has announced that it will amend the RTE Act to include learning levels of students as a recognition norm.
Conclusions
This paper has sought to bring together evidence on Indian private schools in one convenient place. It has some surprising and some policy-relevant findings.
The paper shows a rapid migration of students towards private schools, and an emptying of government schools. The out-migration from govt. schools has rendered a high proportion of them economically unviable, with very high 'per pupil expenditures', yielding low value-formoney from public education expenditure, to the extent that three states (Rajasthan, Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh) recently closed down nearly 24,000 government schools. The abandonment of govt. schools is a longer term trend visible in DISE data from 2005, yet education policy and legislation has been ignoring this trend. For example, section 6 of the RTE Act 2009 legally obligates States to create more govt. schools -the kind the public has been deserting. An important policy lesson therefore is that decision-takers must take evidence into account before making education policy or legislation.
The paper discovered that a major reason for the rapid growth of private schools is their affordability. Data showed that the vast bulk of private schools in India are 'low' fee schools, when benchmarked against the state per capita income and daily wagers' incomes. From a policy maker's angle, the fact that about 80% of private schools' fee levels are lower than government schools' per pupil expenditure, draws attention to the serious difficulty that such low-fee private schools must face in mustering the resources to comply with the infrastructure norms of the Right to Education (RTE) Act 2009 without public subsidy, when most of the (well-funded) government schools themselves cannot comply with these norms; not surprisingly perhaps, data suggested that many private schools have been compelled to close down due to such non-compliance. It is clearly useful if policy on how to utilise, support and regulate private schools can take into account these realities, in order to avoid unintended counterproductive effects such as the closure of the low-fee private schools which may be successfully imparting learning but which lack the resources to fulfil the demanding infrastructure and other conditions of government recognition.
The third major finding in the paper is that private schools are able to run on low fee -or low per-student-cost compared to govt. schools -mainly because their teacher salaries are a small fraction of the salaries in government schools. Government teacher salaries in India are high not only in relation to private schools but also compared with those in other countries. Despite being paid at least four times the salaries of teachers in China (in terms of multiples of their respective per capita incomes), Indian teachers' performance -judged from the learning levels of their students -has been very poor in the international PISA test, with India ranking 73 rd and China ranking 2 nd , out of 74 countries. This suggests the need to link future teacher salary increases to the degree of teachers' acceptance of greater accountability, rather than across-theboard increases irrespective of performance or accountability. The paper discussed some ways of increasing accountability.
The discussion on the Right to Education Act 2009 suggests that the higher-fee private schools resist the RTE Act firstly because of their fear of loss of autonomy and the potential to be blackmailed under the Right to Information Act 2005 if they accept government reimbursement money and, secondly, the very low rate of reimbursement per child by the state governments for educating poor and disadvantaged students, a rate much below the amount stipulated in the RTE Act. It shows that many low fee private schools are unable to comply with the expensive 'recognition' conditions, leading to their being closed down or threatened to be closed-down by the education authorities.
The significantly higher value-for-money offered to parents by private schools -compared to the value for money from public expenditure on government schools -suggests that a public private partnership (PPP) model would be useful, whereby the public sector funds but the private sector produces education. However, there are scores of different designs of PPPs within each of the broad types (voucher schemes, Charter schools, Concession schools) in different countries -each with its own inherent in-built incentive structures for the schools and teachers. Before choosing any particular form of educational PPP, India must study these different designs and their relevance/applicability/adaptability, and must also pilot test the chosen models before scaling up any novel interventions. As shown in section 8 above, there have been major implementation problems with the PPP legislated in India's Right to Education Act 2009 because the stipulated form of PPP was never pilot tested in a few districts and improved, before being enacted for the entire country and given legislative force.
It is hoped that this paper will assist in the formulation of more evidence-based education policy and legislation in India, rather than policy that may be formulated on hunch, ideology or expediency. The evidence presented here can assist decision-takers to craft policy based on the realities of private and public schooling in India, rather than in the absence of the knowledge of these realities. Note: PPE in public schools in each state is calculated by taking the total elementary education expenditure of the state plus central government's expenditure in the state on Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan inputs (such as free uniforms, textbooks, cash scholarships, school improvement grants etc. but not on the mid-day meals) for 2014-15, and dividing this total public expenditure by the number of students enrolled in government elementary schools within the state, as taken from the District Information System on Education (DISE) data for 2014-15. These PPE estimates cannot be compared with those in Dongre and Kapur (2016) for a variety of reasons, several of which are set out in Annex 1.
